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Abstract
Buying lottery tickets is not a rational investment from a financial point of view. Yet, 
the majority of people participate at least once a year in a lottery. We conducted a 
field experiment to increase understanding of lottery participation. Using representa-
tive data for the Netherlands, we find that lottery participation increased the happiness 
of participants before the draw. Winning a small prize had no effect on happiness. Our 
results indicate that people may not only care about the outcomes of the lottery, but 
also enjoy the game. Accordingly, we conclude that lottery participation has a utility 
value in itself and part of the utility of a lottery ticket is consumed before the draw.
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1 Introduction
The average return on lottery tickets is typically just over 50%, which is consider-
ably lower than the average return on other gambling games, such as horse racing, 
blackjack and roulette (Clotfelter and Cook 1990). Although buying lottery tickets 
is not a rational investment from a financial point of view, lottery play is the most 
popular form of gambling and the majority of the population participates at least 
once a year in a lottery (Kearney 2005; Garvía 2007). In 2015, the sales in the Euro-
pean lottery sector amounted to approximately €80 billion (The European Lotteries 
2015), with European citizens spending on average €100 per person per year on lot-
tery tickets. To increase our understanding of lottery participation, we conducted a 
field experiment randomly providing free lottery tickets to some participants of an 
existing household panel survey.
In the economics literature, several explanations for widespread lottery play have 
been put forward. Already at the end of the 1940s, Friedman and Savage (1948) 
argued that lottery play offers an opportunity to win substantial amounts of money 
and improve one’s socio-economic status at a relatively low stake. Following the 
Friedman–Savage hypothesis and its later extensions and modifications (e.g, Pryor 
1976; Brunk 1981; Hartley and Farrell 2002; Nyman et  al. 2008), lottery play is 
considered rational when it offers the opportunity to improve one’s socioeconomic 
status or lifestyle when there are few or no other options to realize this otherwise. 
In prospect theory, widespread lottery play has been attributed to irrational beliefs 
that people uphold regarding their chances of winning a lottery since people tend 
to overweight the small chances of winning the lottery (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979).
Although there is some empirical support for both the Friedman–Savage the-
ory and prospect theory, several scholars (e.g., Conlisk 1993; Clotfelter and Cook 
1990; Scott and Gulley 1995) argue that these theories only partly explain peo-
ple’s propensity to gamble. In particular, the Friedman–Savage theory suggests 
that lottery is predominantly played among the low and middle social classes. 
Poorer people indeed tend to spend a larger proportion of their income on lottery 
tickets (Beckert and Lutter 2013), but the theory cannot explain why people play 
the lottery also in those parts of the income distribution where additional wealth 
does not result in much additional expected utility (Walker 1998; Perez and Hum-
phreys 2013). According to prospect theory, some people participate in lottery 
play because they largely overweight their small chances of winning. However, 
also this theory cannot explain widespread gambling because most lottery partici-
pants have quite rational expectations regarding the outcome of a draw (Forrest 
et al. 2000).
A different explanation for widespread lottery play that has received less empiri-
cal attention in the economics literature is that lottery play itself has a utility value 
(Hirshleifer 1966; Eadington 1973; Loewenstein 1987; Conlisk 1993; Le Menestrel 
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2001).1 In other words, there is a non-monetary or process utility of participating 
in a lottery. Lottery players may experience positive emotions before and after the 
draw. Positive emotions before the draw may result from one’s hope for a happier 
life, from the fun and excitement of the game as well as from social bonding activi-
ties when the lottery is played together with family or friends (Forrest et al. 2000; 
Guillén et al. 2011; Kocher et al. 2014). Positive emotions after the draw may origi-
nate from winning a prize, even when the prize is only very small and lower than the 
purchasing price of the lottery ticket. In addition to the monetary utility of winning 
a prize, there may also be a non-monetary utility of winning unrelated to the mag-
nitude of the prize (Sheremeta 2010). Since most lotteries have many small prizes 
and the chance of winning a prize is high (in the lottery in our experiment the prob-
ability to win a prize is 50%), this could explain the widespread popularity of lottery 
play, including (seemingly) irrational behavior and the fact that lottery play takes 
place across the whole income distribution.
While this utility of gambling model has considerable appeal, there is limited 
empirical evidence in support of this model (Perez and Humphreys 2013). This is 
probably due to the difficulty of identifying an appropriate observable proxy for the 
procedural utility generated by playing the lottery (see also, Nyman et  al. (2008)). 
Happiness measures, as suitable indicators of procedural utility measures, have been 
suggested and applied in economic research (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Frey et al. 2004). 
Burger et  al. (2016), using the British Gambling Prevalence Survey 2010, found a 
small positive effect of lottery participation on happiness for individuals who engage 
in lottery play for fun. Bruyneel et  al. (2005) reported that the purchase of lottery 
tickets is associated with reducing negative mood. Along similar lines, in a lab exper-
iment Kocher et al. (2014) identified hope and thrill as determinants of the popular-
ity of Lotto tickets. Other studies showed a positive relationship between the hope 
of winning and lottery participation (Forrest et  al. 2000; Clarke 2005; Ariyabud-
dhiphongs and Chanchalermporn 2007). These findings are also echoed in studies 
that examined the motives for lottery play: people do not only play for the money, but 
also for social bonding and fun (Miyazaki et al. 1999; Burger et al. 2016).
In our study, we focus on understanding participation in lotteries. We investigate 
the utility of lottery play using a field experiment. Some randomly selected partici-
pants in a regular panel survey were provided with a free ticket of the Dutch State 
Lottery while others were not.2 We assess the procedural utility of lottery play by 
comparing the change in momentary happiness (i.e. happiness experienced today) 
1 Another explanation for the popularity of different gambling games is that lottery play is not perceived 
as gambling and relatively free of social stigma (Ariyabuddhiphongs 2011), unlike for example horse-
racing betting and casino play. In addition, lotteries are more accessible compared to other forms of 
gambling (Felsher et al. 2004) and characterized by an extreme skewness of prizes (there is often only 
one extreme big prize), which is thought to make lotteries relatively attractive (Garrett and Sobel 1999). 
However, a further discussion on the popularity of the lottery compared to other forms of gambling is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
2 The State Lottery is the largest draw game lottery in the Netherlands. In contrast to other games in the 
lottery industry (e.g. Lotto, Toto, or scratch cards), a draw game lottery is passive since players cannot 
choose exact numbers and there is often a long time between draws. Furthermore, the revenues from the 
lottery are confiscated by the government. So, in comparison with other lotteries which use revenues to 
support good causes, the state lottery does generate less “warm glow”.
 M. J. Burger et al.
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of lottery players and non-lottery players at three points in time: (1) before receiv-
ing a (free) lottery ticket, (2) after receiving a lottery ticket but before the draw, and 
(3) after the draw. We examine both the procedural utility of lottery play before and 
after the draw. We hypothesize that before the draw, players may gain procedural 
utility from the excitement of playing the game, the hope of winning a large prize, as 
well as social bonding, while after the draw players may gain procedural utility from 
winning a small prize (which was in almost all cases smaller than the original retail 
price of the ticket). To rule out the possibility that the utility effect we observe is 
related to receiving a free lottery ticket, and to account for the fact that some people 
purchased a lottery ticket themselves, we compare four groups of people: with a free 
lottery ticket, with a purchased lottery ticket, with both a free and purchased lottery 
ticket, and without a lottery ticket.
Our paper contributes to the economics literature on lottery play and consumption 
in several ways. First, although many economic studies have addressed the utility 
gains of lottery wins, this is to the best of our knowledge the first paper to causally 
identify the procedural utility of lottery play using a large-scale field experiment. 
Second, in our study we take into account that lottery players may gain procedural 
utility before and after the draw. We find that lottery participation increases momen-
tary happiness before the draw, but winning a small prize has no effect on momen-
tary happiness. These results indicate that there is a procedural utility of gambling in 
the sense that people do not only care about winning prizes, but also enjoy the game. 
We conclude that lottery play has a utility value in itself. Third, and more generally, 
our article shows that consumption outcomes are not the only source of utility, but 
consumers also enjoy procedural utility, which is in turn a driving force behind con-
sumer behavior (Frey and Stutzer 2002; Frey et al. 2004).
2  Experimental design and data
For our field experiment we used the CentERpanel, a household panel that is main-
tained by CentERdata, a research institute affiliated with Tilburg University. The 
panel is representative of the Dutch population and exists since 1991. Currently, the 
CentERpanel contains well over 2000 households. Panel members use their com-
puters or smartphones to participate in the study and complete questionnaires on a 
weekly basis. All CentER panel survey participants get compensated for filling out 
surveys by receiving CentERpanel points, which can be exchanged for money or a 
gift certificate, or can be donated to charity. The number of points people received 
for filling out our survey was the same for people who received a free lottery ticket 
and people who did not receive a free lottery ticket.3
The initial objective of our field experiment was twofold: (1) investigate how peo-
ple that infrequently play the lottery experience lottery play and (2) investigate the 
3 On average, CentERpanel participants receive 25 points per questionnaire, which has the value of 1 
euro. Panelists who participate longer receive extra points. Specifically, after 40 weeks of participation a 
households receives 1.5 times the regular number of points, and after 100 weeks of participation house-
holds receive twice the regular number (Teppa and Vis 2012).
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non-monetary utility effects of lottery play.4 Participants in our experiment filled out 
a questionnaire at three moments in time. The first questionnaire, held between April 
17–28, 2015 ( T1 ) and filled out by 1611 panel members, was intended to obtain 
information about the participants’ baseline level of subjective well-being, their 
gambling behavior—particularly with regard to lottery games—and their socio-
demographic characteristics and personality. Subsequently, a large 1300 respond-
ents (81%) were randomly invited to participate in the field experiment. Of the 1300 
invitees, 1100 (85%) randomly received a free “full” lottery ticket (purchase price: 
€15) to participate in the State Lottery. Please note that the main reason why many 
people received a free ticket is that one of the objectives of the study was to inves-
tigate how people that infrequently play the lottery experience lottery play.5 This 
ticket was sent approximately one week before the State Lottery draw of May 10, 
2015.6
Next, all participants were asked to fill out a second questionnaire between May 
8–10, 2015 ( T2 ) with questions about their subjective well-being and thoughts about 
lottery play. After the draw of May 10, respondents were asked to complete a third 
questionnaire between May 10–12, 2015 ( T3 ) about their subjective well-being, 
the outcome of the lottery draw (whether the participant won a prize or not), and 
thoughts about lottery play.7 In total, 1299 participants finished the questionnaires at 
( T1 ) and ( T2 ), while 1155 participants filled out all three questionnaires. After delet-
ing observations with missing data, the analysis sample includes 1142 participants 
in the T1–T2 comparison and 1097 respondents in the T1–T3 comparison. We base 
our analyses on these two groups. To examine the effect of lottery play on proce-
dural utility, we distinguish four groups: (1) people without a ticket, (2) people with 
only a free lottery ticket, (3) people with only a purchased lottery ticket, and (4) peo-
ple with both a free and purchased lottery ticket.8 This distinction is important for 
4 For this reason, we gave many people a free lottery ticket, resulting in the uneven group sizes for the 
four experimental conditions.
5 Individuals can participate in the State Lottery in the Netherlands by buying separate lottery tickets 
or through a subscription. About half of the individuals who bet in the State Lottery do so through a 
subscription. There are monthly draws of winning tickets and sometimes special draws are organized 
at the end of the year or on other occasions. There is also a Jackpot, an additional large prize of at least 
€7.5 million. The Jackpot is not guaranteed in each draw and, if there is no ticket that wins the Jackpot 
in a certain draw, the full amount is transferred to the next one. For participants, there is choice between 
“full” tickets of €15 and “partial” tickets of €3 which pays one fifth of the full amount if it is a winning 
ticket. Bigger prizes in each draw range from €1000 to €1 million. Each draw also has smaller prizes, 
ranging from €5 to €1000. In our experiment, at most one person per household could participate in the 
experiment. Total ticket spending on the project amounted to €16,500. It was fully clear to respondents 
that the free State Lottery ticket they received was related to their participation in the CentERpanel. Two 
respondents in our experiment returned the lottery ticket for religious reasons.
6 In May 2015 the Jackpot of €13.5 million was paid out; the expected earnings were €10.25 per ticket. 
In 2015 there were 16 draws of the State Lottery with a total revenue of €692 million and a net of lottery 
taxes prize money of €413 million which makes an average of €26 million of prize money per draw (see 
Nederlandse Staatsloterij 2016).
7 The possibility to fill out the questionnaire at T2 ended before the draw on May 10. The possibility to 
fill out the questionnaire at T3 started after the draw on May 10.
8 As suggested by one of the reviewers, an alternative setup would be to incorporate a condition in 
which one of the groups receives cash. However, due to budget limitations we were not able to extend the 
experiment.
 M. J. Burger et al.
1 3
two reasons. First, in our field experiment we cannot rule out that people purchase 
or have already purchased tickets for the lottery draw. By giving away free tickets for 
the lottery draw, we try to bypass the problem that our results could be distorted by 
a selection of happy people or thrill-seekers into lottery play. Second, having only 
participants with a free ticket and no purchased tickets would also have been a prob-
lem, since the procedural utility of participants can originate from obtaining the free 
ticket itself, when this is considered as a small gift. Overall, we have in our field 
experiment 122 participants with no ticket, 673 participants with only a free ticket, 
49 participants with only a purchased ticket, and 298 participants with both a free 
and purchased ticket.
We capture procedural utility with momentary happiness, which is measured 
by the following question: ‘How happy do you feel today?’ with answer categories 
ranging from 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy).9 In particular, we are interested 
in how people’s daily happiness develops around the lottery draw. On average, the 
participants in the field experiment scored 7.6 in the first questionnaire, 7.5 in the 
second questionnaire, and 7.4 in the third questionnaire. These scores are compara-
ble to the average happiness obtained in the Netherlands from other Dutch surveys 
(Veenhoven 2018).10
Because of the experimental set-up there is no need for including control vari-
ables but we nevertheless did this to account for possible non-randomness in the 
set-up. As control variables, we included several personal and personality charac-
teristics. The personal characteristics we included are gender, age, income, educa-
tional attainment, occupational status, marital status, household composition, and 
characteristics of the place of residence. The personality characteristics we included 
are based on answers to questions regarding level of materialism, locus of control, 
and degree of optimism. In addition, we controlled for the general gambling behav-
ior of the respondents as well as the date on which the respondents completed their 
questionnaires and how they experienced the survey questionnaires, i.e. whether 
they enjoyed answering the questions or whether they found it difficult. Finally, we 
controlled for changes in life satisfaction in the period under observation to account 
for possible events that affected people’s happiness with life over the period studied. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the evaluation of life satisfaction is—like hap-
piness today—also dependent on momentary moods. Hence, the models in which 
9 We use a more momentary measure of subjective well-being instead of the more stable life satisfaction 
measure, since procedural utility is better operationalized by survey questions that capture ‘happiness in 
life’ than survey questions that capture ‘happiness with life’ (Veenhoven 2000).
10 Declining happiness scores have also been found in other panel studies where through panel condi-
tioning people report lower happiness scores the longer they participate in a panel (Chadi 2013) whereas 
Van Landeghem (2014) notes that these panel effects vary widely across studies. However, because of 
the small calendar time period between our subsequent surveys panel attrition is an unlikely candidate to 
explain the overall drop in happiness we find. Nevertheless, even over a short time period circumstances 
under which respondents fill in questionnaires may differ. We find that reported happiness is higher in 
weekend-days and lower on rainy days. This explains at least part of the drop in overall happiness. The 
gap between T1 and T2 is largely explained by more rain in T2 while a substantial part of the drop in 
happiness between T1 and T3 is explained by almost half of the respondents answering the T1 question-
naire in the weekend compared to no-one in T3.
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we control for life satisfaction changes can be considered as conservative estimates 
for the procedural utility of lottery play.11
As a robustness check, we investigated whether the joy of lottery play was contin-
gent on thoughts about the lottery draw and positive and negative feelings regarding 
the draw, and willingness to pay for a lottery ticket. In our survey at T2 , we asked 
the respondents how often they thought about the State Lottery. Answer categories 
ranged from 1 (never) to 7 (all the time). In addition, lottery players were asked the 
following question before the draw ( T2 ): ‘What emotions do you experience when 
you think about your participation in the draw of the State Lottery of May 10th?’.12 
Respondents indicated on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely) to what extent 
they felt happy, hopeful, excited, curious, trusting, amused, and friendly (positive 
emotions) as well as to what extent they felt worried, sad, annoyed, disappointed, 
regret, distant, and indifferent (negative emotions). Willingness to pay was exam-
ined in the survey at T1 , where participants had to make a choice between receiving 
a small sum of money or a lottery ticket with a retail price of €15 in a hypothetical 
experiment. An overview of the variables included in the analysis is presented in 
Appendix A, while the questionnaires are available in online Appendix B.
3  Procedural utility before the draw
We start our analysis by investigating the presence of procedural utility before the 
draw. Through linear regression, we related happiness to the type of lottery ticket 
people possessed (purchased, free or both) and to a series of control variables. To 
remove observed and unobserved time-invariant characteristics from the analysis, 
we used as dependent variable the change in happiness between survey 1 and survey 
2, 훥H12,i . We assume the following relationship:
where 훼1 represents a vector of interview date fixed effects, i refers to an individual, 
F is a dummy variable for whether or not a free lottery ticket was received (but no 
lottery ticket was bought), B is a dummy variable with value 1 if no free lottery 
ticket was received but one was bought, C is a dummy variable with value 1 if the 
individual had received a free lottery ticket in addition to having bought one, and 훥 
indicates the first difference of a variable. Furthermore, X is a vector of personal and 
personality characteristics, S if a vector of survey characteristics and LS represents 
life satisfaction. Finally, 훽1 to 훽6 are our (vectors of) parameters and 휀12 is an error 
term.
(1)훥H12,i = 훼1 + 훽1Fi + 훽2Bi + 훽3Ci + 훽4Xi + 훽5훥S12,i + 훽6훥LSi + 휀12,i
12 A similar question was asked in T3 where participants also had to reflect on their emotions regarding 
the draw of May 10.
11 Although controlling for life satisfaction takes into account changes in one’s life that cannot be attrib-
uted to obtaining a lottery ticket between T1 and T2 , this variable is endogenous because of the halo 
effect: people in a better mood, evaluate all aspects of life and life in general higher.
 M. J. Burger et al.
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In case of procedural utility before the draw, we expect that the change in hap-
piness between T1 and T2 is significantly larger for lottery participants than for non-
lottery participants. Furthermore, we expect that the change in happiness between T1 
and T2 is not significantly larger for lottery participants with a free ticket than for lot-
tery participants with a purchased ticket. If there would be a difference, the increase 
in happiness could be related to a monetary transfer, i.e. receiving the lottery ticket 
for free.
Table  1 provides the OLS parameter estimates for the change in happiness 
between T1 and T2.13 The first column shows the parameter estimates of the lottery 
ticket effect on the change in happiness without including control variables. On 
average, people with a lottery ticket report a significantly higher change in happiness 
score (Panel A), where there are no significant differences between players with only 
a free ticket, a free and purchased ticket, and only a purchased ticket (Panel B).14 As 
Table 1  Parameter estimates change in happiness between T1 and T2
Based on 1142 observations; reference group: no ticket; robust standard errors in parentheses
**p < 0.01 , * p < 0.05 , # p < 0.10
Panel A
   Lottery ticket ( 훽1 = 훽2 = 훽3 = 훽∗1) 0.40 (0.12)** 0.37 (0.13)** 0.25 (0.11)*
   R2 0.01 0.07 0.20
Panel B
   Free ticket ( 훽1) 0.38 (0.13)** 0.37 (0.13)** 0.26 (0.12)*
   Free ticket—no lottery play last year ( 훽1a) 0.27 (0.12)*
   Free ticket—state lottery play last year 
( 훽1b)
0.26 (0.14)#
   Purchased ticket ( 훽2) 0.56 (0.20)** 0.52 (0.21)* 0.39 (0.21)#
   Free and purchased ticket ( 훽3) 0.40 (0.13)** 0.34 (0.14)* 0.19 (0.13)
   R2 0.01 0.07 0.20 0.20
   훽1 = 훽2 (p value) 0.31 0.38 0.51
   훽1 = 훽3 (p value) 0.86 0.74 0.30
   훽2 = 훽3 (p value) 0.36 0.31 0.29
   훽1a = 훽1b (p value) 0.96
Personal controls No Yes Yes Yes
Lottery behavior controls No Yes Yes Yes
Survey controls No Yes Yes Yes
Change life satisfaction No No Yes Yes
13 The full estimation results can be found in online Appendix C. The estimation results show the effects 
of gradually introducing groups of control variables.
14 We can only speculate about the reasons why the three groups experience similar happiness effects. 
On the one hand, a larger effect could be expected for people with a purchased ticket because people who 
derive relatively more utility from lottery play are more likely to have already purchased a lottery ticket 
(a self-selection mechanism). On the other hand, we cannot rule out that there is a small gift effect for 
people with a free ticket. A likely reason that people with both a purchased and free ticket were not hap-
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shown in the second column, our results are robust to including several groups of 
control variables, i.e. personal characteristics, lottery behavior variables and survey 
characteristics. In the third column, we also control for the change in life satisfac-
tion in the period between T1 and T2—which can be considered a very conservative 
estimate of the lottery play effect. Even then, the effect of obtaining a lottery ticket 
on the change in happiness is positive and significant. All in all, we conclude that on 
a scale from 1 to 10, participating in a lottery increases happiness with 0.25–0.40.15
One potential problem in our analysis is that in the group of free ticket holders 
there are individuals that intended to buy a ticket but a free one came along and the 
purchase never happened. In a sensitivity analysis represented in the fourth column 
of Table 1, we therefore distinguish between holders of free tickets who played the 
State lottery last year (and therefore have a higher chance to have the intention to 
buy a ticket) and holders of free tickets that did not play the State lottery in the last 
year. As shown, there is no difference in happiness gain between T1 and T2 between 
the two groups. In the group of people who participated in the State lottery last year, 
we made a further distinction between frequent and infrequent gamblers (at least 
monthly vs. less than one time per month). Again, we find no difference between the 
different groups.16
It can be argued that it is difficult to gain procedural utility from a lottery draw if 
one never thinks about the lottery. Hence, we re-estimated our models, using infor-
mation from the survey shortly before the lottery draw. More specifically, we inves-
tigated whether the intensity of thinking about the lottery affects the change in hap-
piness before the lottery draw, i.e. between T1 and T2 . Here, we distinguish between 
three groups of lottery players: players that never thought about the lottery (answer 
category 1; 15% of the lottery players), players that sometimes thought about the 
lottery (answer category 2–3; 69% of the lottery players), and players that frequently 
thought about the lottery (answer category 4 or higher; 16% ) using the following 
equation:
15 Statistically, we observe that between T1 and T2 the momentary happiness in the group of partici-
pants decreases less than in the group of non-participants. As noted by one of the reviewers, an alter-
native explanation for our findings could be that the happiness of the non-participants was negatively 
affected because of answering questions about a lottery in which they did not participate. However, it is 
very unlikely that this causes the drop in momentary happiness of non-participants because the question 
about momentary happiness was not directly related to lottery play and it was asked at the beginning 
of the survey. In addition, the participants without a ticket were not informed that other CentER panel 
participants had received lottery tickets, and they did not receive any further questions about lottery par-
ticipation.
16 We also investigate heterogeneity in the effect of having a lottery ticket on the change in happiness 
between T1 and T2. We did not find heterogeneous effects across educational attainment, income level, 
socioeconomic status, gender, age, having children, geographic area of residence and materialistic dis-
position. We find heterogeneity in the effect of having a lottery ticket on happiness change between T1 
and T2 across marital status (for singles the effect is stronger), original happiness level (people that 
score high have less to gain), and locus of control (for people with external locus of control the effect is 
stronger).
pier than people with either a purchased or free ticket is because of strong decreasing returns of an extra 
ticket. With one ticket you can dream as much about winning the lottery as with multiple tickets.
Footnote 14 (continued)
 M. J. Burger et al.
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where 훼2 represents a vector of interview date fixed effects, LT is a dummy variable 
indicating whether or not an individual had a lottery ticket irrespective of whether 
this was bought or received because of the field experiment and I1–I3 are dummy 
variables indicating whether the individual had no thoughts about the lottery, some-
times thought about the lottery or frequently thought about the lottery. And, 훾1–훾6 are 
(vectors of) parameters.
The first column of Table 2 shows that players who never thought about the lot-
tery did not experience a significantly higher increase in happiness than non-play-
ers. At the same time, players who thought about the lottery experienced higher 
increases in happiness than non-players and players who never thought about the 
lottery. As shown in the second and third columns, the difference remains significant 
if we include control variables and also the change in life satisfaction. The fourth to 
sixth column of Table 2 show that our results hold if we account for the intensity 
of thinking about the lottery draw. The change in happiness between T1 and T2 after 
receiving a lottery ticket is present if the individual thought about the lottery, but 
it does not matter whether the individual thought about the lottery sometimes or 
frequently.
Along similar lines, it is difficult to gain procedural utility from a lottery draw if 
one does not have positive feelings when thinking about the lottery. Accordingly, we 
examined to what extent the procedural utility from a lottery draw is contingent on 
having overall positive emotions when thinking about the draw. In this regard, it is 
also interesting to note that participants thinking regularly about the draw experience 
higher levels of positive emotions and not higher levels of negative emotions com-
pared to participants thinking never or only sometimes about the draw (see Fig. 1). 
We observe this across the whole range of positive emotions.17 In our regression, 
we investigate whether having positive emotions about the draw affects the change 
in happiness before the draw (again between T1 and T2 ), where we take the balance 
of positive to negative affect (PANA) score regarding the draw as main indicator for 
the positivity ratio when thinking about the draw. We use the following equation:
(2)
훥H12,i = 훼2 + 훾1LTiI1,i + 훾2LTiI2,i + 훾3LTiI3,i + 훾4Xi + 훾5훥S12,i + 훾6훥LSi + 휖12,i
(3)훥H12,i = 훼3 + 휙1LTi + 휙2LTiPN2,i + 휙3Xi + 휙4훥S12,i + 휙5훥LSi + 휈12,i
17 Of course, some respondents may be biased toward more positive answers regarding the State Lottery 
because they have received a free ticket through their participation in the panel. Although these recipro-
cal feelings may influence the PANA score, it should not influence the relationship between the PANA 
score and momentary happiness because our happiness measure has no direct relation with the receipt of 
a free lottery ticket (a “gift”). The balance of positive to negative emotions is also known as the positiv-
ity ratio and estimated as the average positive affect (PA) score minus the negative affect (NA) score. 
An overview of the emotions included can be found in Fig. 1 and the methodology section. A potential 
problem with the PANA measure is that some emotions regarding the draw may have been affected by 
the reception of a free ticket. Hence, we re-estimated our model including only future-oriented positive 
emotions that are only affected by the upcoming draw (hopeful and curious) and excluding those positive 
emotions that are potentially affected by the receipt of a free gift (happy, friendly, trusting, amused, and 
excited). These results are available upon request and yielded no different conclusions.
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where 훼3 represents again a vector of interview date fixed effects and LT is a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not an individual had a lottery ticket irrespective of 
whether this was bought or received because of the field experiment, PN is a mean-
centered continuous variable indicating a respondents’ positivity ratio (PANA) 
regarding the draw. And, 휙1 to 휙5 are (vectors of) parameters. Our regression results 
are presented in Table 3. The first two columns show that players who had a higher 
positivity ratio regarding the draw experienced higher increases in happiness, where 
column 3–6 show that these results are primarily driven by the positive emotions. 
To exemplify, players that had no or hardly any positive emotions at all regarding 
the draw (maximum average score on the PA of 2 out of 7), did not experience an 
increase in happiness between T1 and T2 ( p = 0.086).
Indirectly, the joy of lottery play could also be inferred from people’s willingness 
to pay for a lottery ticket. In the survey at T1 , participants indicated their willingness 
to pay for a lottery ticket. In a hypothetical experiment, participants made a choice 
between receiving a small sum of money or a lottery ticket with a retail price of €15. 
Although this can also indicate that people overestimate the expected value of a lot-
tery ticket, many people choose to get the lottery ticket when the amount of money 
they would have received was larger than the retail price of the lottery ticket. Most 
notably, 43% of the participants preferred the lottery ticket over receiving €17.50, 
while even 30% of the participants preferred the lottery ticket over receiving €25.18
Table 2  Additional parameter estimates change in happiness between T1 and T2 : thinking about the draw
Based on 1140 observations; reference group: no ticket; robust standard errors in parentheses
**p < 0.01 , * p < 0.05 , # p < 0.10
Lottery ticket and thoughts about lottery
   No thoughts ( 훾1) 0.08 (0.17) 0.16 (0.16) 0.07 (0.14) 0.08 (0.17) 0.16 (0.16) 0.07 (0.14)
   Thoughts 
( 훾2 = 훾3 = 훾∗2)
0.45 
(0.13)**
0.41 
(0.13)**
0.29 (0.12)*
   Thought some-
times ( 훾2)
0.41 (0.13)** 0.39 (0.13)** 0.27 (0.12)*
   Thought frequently 
( 훾3)
0.62 (0.15)** 0.52 (0.16)** 0.39 (0.14)**
   R2 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.02 0.08 0.20
   훾1 = 훾∗2 (p value) 0.00 0.04 0.04
   훾1 = 훾2 (p value) 0.01 0.07 0.06
   훾1 = 훾3 (p value) 0.00 0.02 0.02
   훾2 = 훾3 (p value) 0.06 0.21 0.23
Personal controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Lottery behavior 
controls
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Survey controls No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Change life satisfaction No No Yes No No Yes
18 This suggests that for these participants, the transaction costs of buying a lottery ticket were perceived 
to be more than €10, i.e. the difference between €25 and the price of a lottery ticket. At the same time, 
participants realized that the chances of winning were small. Our survey showed that well over 80% of 
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4  Procedural utility of winning a small prize
We want to assess the happiness effect of winning a small lottery prize. For this, we 
related the change in happiness between surveys 1 and 3, 훥H13,i to explanatory vari-
ables as follows:
where 훼4 represents a vector of interview date fixed effects, Pi is a dummy variable 
for whether or not the individual won a (small) prize and 훿1 to 훿9 are (vectors of) 
parameters.
In case of procedural utility after the draw, originating from winning a small 
prize, we expect that the change in happiness between T1 and T3 is significantly 
larger for lottery winners than for non-players. Furthermore, we expect that the 
change in happiness between T1 and T3 is significantly larger for lottery winners than 
(4)
훥H13,i = 훼4 + (훿1Fi + 훿2Bi + 훿3Ci)(1 − Pi)
+ (훿4Fi + 훿5Bi + 훿6Ci)Pi + 훿7Xi + 훿8훥S12,i + 훿9훥LSi + 휀13,i
Fig. 1  Positive and negative emotions about participation in the State Lottery; experienced before the 
lottery draw by frequency of thinking about the draw Note: Only for respondents who possessed a lottery 
ticket for the lottery draw of May 10; average answers to questions on emotions on a scale from 1 (not at 
all) to 7 (completely)
Footnote 18 (continued)
the respondents that regularly played the lottery thought that the chance to win a large prize in the lottery 
is small to very small, while less than 5% thought that the chance was large to very large.
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for non-lottery winners. Finally, we expect that the change in happiness between T1 
and T3 is not significantly larger for lottery winners with a free ticket than for lottery 
winners with a purchased ticket.
In the draw in which the participants of our experiment had a lottery ticket, 49% 
did not win a prize at all, 39% won less than 10 euro, 11% won a prize between 
10 and 100 euro, and 1% won a prize larger than 100 euro. On average, we do not 
find evidence for procedural utility after the draw, originating from winning a small 
prize. Lottery winners did not experience a significantly larger change in happiness 
between T1 and T3 compared to non-players. Nevertheless, as shown in panel A of 
Table 4 there is a significant difference between those that had a lottery ticket and 
won a prize and those that had a lottery ticket and did not win a prize.
Panel B of Table 4 shows the parameter estimates if we also make a distinction 
between the ways through which the individual got a lottery ticket, i.e. purchased, 
free or both. Now we find that there is only a positive and significant effect for those 
with a small prize and a free ticket, while at the same time the winners with a free 
ticket are significantly happier than winners with both free and purchased tickets. 
These results are independent of whether or not we include control variables and the 
change in life satisfaction.
We conclude from these estimations that only a combination of not having pur-
chased a lottery ticket and receiving one for free and winning a prize leads to an 
increase in happiness and that the effect of a small prize is very limited. The latter 
conclusion is supported by a test in which participants (n = 401) who did not see 
the results of the lottery draw had the opportunity to look up the results via a link in 
the survey to check whether they had won or not won a prize in the lottery.19 This 
opportunity was provided after the question asking how the participants felt today. 
At the end of the survey, participants were asked how happy they were feeling at this 
moment on a scale from 0 to 10. Respondents who viewed the link and won a prize 
were not significantly happier than respondents who viewed the link and did not win 
a prize ( p = 0.93 ). This result was found regardless of whether one had a purchased 
ticket ( p = 0.13 ), a free and purchased ticket ( p = 0.49 ), or a free ticket ( p = 0.87).
As a robustness check, we also examined differences in specific emotions after 
the draw. Again participants were asked which emotions they experienced when 
they thought back about participating in the draw of the State Lottery on May 10th. 
Although winners reported to be happier and less disappointed, winners and non-
winners did only marginally differ regarding the other experienced emotions regard-
ing the draw (see Fig.  2). In a further analysis, we only found evidence for pro-
cedural utility for winners that were already positive about the lottery before the 
draw.20 This fuels the idea that the procedural non-monetary utility derived from 
winning a (small) prize is rather limited.
19 People were asked whether they already saw the results. If not, they were offered the opportunity to 
view the results via a link.
20 This analysis is available upon request.
1 3
The joy of lottery play: evidence from a field experiment 
Ta
bl
e 
4 
 Pa
ra
m
ete
r e
sti
m
ate
s c
ha
ng
e i
n h
ap
pi
ne
ss
 be
tw
ee
n T
1 a
nd
 T 3
Ba
se
d o
n 1
09
7 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
; r
efe
re
nc
e g
ro
up
: n
o t
ick
et;
 ro
bu
st 
sta
nd
ar
d e
rro
rs 
in
 pa
re
nt
he
se
s
**
p
<
0
.0
1 , 
* p
<
0
.0
5
 , #
 p
<
0
.1
0
Pa
ne
l A
 L
ot
ter
y t
ick
et 
an
d n
o p
riz
e (
 훿 1
=
훿
2
=
훿
3
=
훿
∗ 1
)
− 
0.1
0 (
0.1
1)
− 
0.0
5 (
0.1
1)
− 
0.0
4 (
0.1
2)
− 
0.0
9 (
0.1
1)
− 
0.1
5 (
0.1
0)
 L
ot
ter
y t
ick
et 
an
d p
riz
e (
 훿 4
=
훿
5
=
훿
6
=
훿
∗ 4
)
0.1
0 (
0.1
1)
0.1
5 (
0.1
1)
0.1
5 (
0.1
1)
0.0
9 (
0.1
1)
0.0
2 (
0.1
0)
 R
2
0.0
1
0.0
2
0.0
2
0.0
6
0.1
8
 훿∗ 1
=
훿
∗ 4
 (p
 va
lu
e)
0.0
2
0.0
2
0.0
2
0.0
3
0.0
3
Pa
ne
l B
 F
re
e t
ick
et 
an
d n
o p
riz
e (
 훿 1)
− 
0.1
5 (
0.1
2)
− 
0.1
1 (
0.1
2)
− 
0.1
1 (
0.1
2)
− 
0.1
5 (
0.1
2)
− 
0.1
9 (
0.1
1)
*
 P
ur
ch
as
ed
 ti
ck
et 
an
d n
o p
riz
e (
 훿 2
)
− 
0.0
5 (
0.2
3)
0.0
4 (
0.2
5)
0.0
4 (
0.2
5)
0.0
6 (
0.2
6)
− 
0.0
3 (
0.2
2)
 F
re
e a
nd
 pu
rc
ha
se
d t
ick
et 
an
d n
o p
riz
e (
 훿 3
)
0.0
5 (
0.1
4)
0.1
0 (
0.1
4)
0.1
1 (
0.1
4)
0.0
4 (
0.1
4)
− 
0.0
8 (
0.1
3)
 F
re
e t
ick
et 
an
d p
riz
e (
 훿 4
)
0.2
2 (
0.1
2)
#
0.2
5 (
0.1
2)
*
0.2
5 (
0.1
2)
*
0.1
7 (
0.1
2)
*
0.1
0 (
0.1
0)
 P
ur
ch
as
ed
 ti
ck
et 
an
d p
riz
e (
 훿 5
)
0.0
4 (
0.2
4)
0.0
8 (
0.2
5)
0.1
0 (
0.2
6)
0.0
8 (
0.2
5)
− 
0.0
0 (
0.2
4)
 F
re
e a
nd
 pu
rc
ha
se
d t
ick
et 
an
d p
riz
e (
 훿 6
)
− 
0.1
0 (
0.1
3)
− 
0.0
4 (
0.1
4)
− 
0.0
3 (
0.1
4)
− 
0.0
7 (
0.1
5)
− 
0.1
4 (
0.1
3)
 R
2
0.0
1
0.0
3
0.0
3
0.0
6
0.3
4
  훿 4
=
훿
5
 (p
 va
lu
e)
0.4
3
0.4
7
0.5
2
0.7
1
0.6
7
  훿 4
=
훿
6
 (p
 va
lu
e)
0.0
0
0.0
1
0.0
2
0.0
4
0.0
4
  훿 5
=
훿
6
 (p
 va
lu
e)
0.5
6
0.6
5
0.6
3
0.5
3
0.5
8
Pe
rso
na
l c
on
tro
ls
No
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Lo
tte
ry
 be
ha
vi
or
 co
nt
ro
ls
No
No
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ye
s
Su
rv
ey
 co
nt
ro
ls
No
No
No
Ye
s
Ye
s
Ch
an
ge
 li
fe 
sa
tis
fac
tio
n
No
No
No
No
Ye
s
 M. J. Burger et al.
1 3
5  Discussion and conclusions
From a financial point of view buying a lottery ticket is not a rational investment as 
the average ex-post value of a ticket is just over half the price of that ticket. Never-
theless, many people participate in lotteries. There are two popular explanations in 
the economics literature for this: (1) low cost opportunities to improve one’s finan-
cial position if there are few opportunities to do this otherwise and (2) prospect the-
ory according to which people overweight the small probability of winning a lottery. 
The first explanation suggests that participation would be predominantly among 
lower social classes which is not the case since lottery play takes place across the 
whole income distribution. The second explanation is at odds with the finding that 
most lottery participants have quite accurate expectations about the probability to 
win a prize. Although there is some empirical support for both the Friedman–Sav-
age theory and prospect theory, these theories only partly explain people’s propen-
sity to gamble.
We studied lottery participation using a field experiment in which some partici-
pants of a regular household survey received a state lottery ticket for free, while 
other participants had no ticket or only a purchased ticket, or both a free and a pur-
chased ticket. This allows us to investigate to what extent participating in a lottery 
increases momentary happiness. If so, this supports a third explanation of lottery 
Fig. 2  Emotions experienced after the draw by winners and non-winners Note: Only for respondents who 
possessed a lottery ticket for the lottery draw of May 10; average answers to questions on emotions on a 
scale from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely)
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participation, i.e. people deriving non-monetary utility from participating in a lot-
tery play. This could be because of the hope of winning a large prize, the fun and 
excitement of the game, or because of social bonding activities when playing the 
lottery together with family or friends.
In our field experiment, momentary happiness is measured at three moments in 
time, i.e. before free lottery tickets are issued, after providing some individuals with 
a free lottery ticket but before the draw, and after the draw. We study the change in 
momentary happiness between the first two moments to investigate whether playing 
in the lottery increases momentary happiness, regardless of whether the ticket was 
bought or free. We also study the change in momentary happiness between the first 
and third moment to investigate to what extent winning a small lottery prize matters.
Our main finding is that participants in a lottery derive procedural utility from 
playing the game. This is irrespective of whether the lottery ticket was bought or 
received for free due to the experiment. On a scale from 1 to 10, participating in 
a lottery increases momentary happiness with 0.25–0.40 (approximately 1/5–1/3 
standard deviation increase). These results may be driven by the hope and expecta-
tions about financial gains, the thrill of a potential win, and social bonding when 
playing as a group. However, the procedural utility that players derive from winning 
a small prize is limited. In sum, we conclude that lottery participation seems to be 
at least partly driven by the joy of lottery play, i.e. lottery participants may be hop-
ing for financial gains but gamble for fun. More generally, our research shows the 
importance of taking in procedural utility in modeling decisions of consumers since 
consumers do not only care about outcomes, but also about the process. Accord-
ingly and in line with previous work, seemingly irrational decisions such as lottery 
play could be considered rational from the perspective of procedural utility (see also 
Benz 2005).
It is important to note that our results are related to the probability of winning 
which is about 50% in the State Lottery. For lotteries with a smaller winning prob-
ability the magnitude of the happiness effects are smaller. It is also important to note 
that our article has focused on the short-term positive impact on lottery play through 
procedural utility and does not pay attention to the potential negative long-term 
effects of lottery play, especially in the case of problem and pathological gambling 
(Lorenz 1990). In this regard, lottery gambling has been associated with psycho-
logical, social, and economic problems. Hence, procedural utility may induce sub-
optimal decision-making in the long-run. At the same time, the number of problem 
lottery gamblers among the population is relatively small (Hendriks et al. 1997) and 
the overall long-term effects of lottery play on overall well-being or experienced 
quality of life seem to be limited (Burger et al. 2016). However, more research on 
the consequences of lottery play are needed to examine the long-term effects of lot-
tery play.
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Appendix A: Overview of control variables
• Personal characteristics
• Female: Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is female
• Age: Age in years
• Employed: Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is working
• Unemployed: Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is unem-
ployed
• High household income: dummy variable indicating whether the net monthly 
household income is over €2600
• High education level: Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent fin-
ished at least a study program at ISCED 5–6 level
• High socio-economic status: Self-assessed status regarding salary, job and 
social status.
• Partner: Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has a partner
• Children: Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has children
• Urban environment and region: Dummy variables indicating level of urban-
ity of residence is at least high or very high; Dummy variable whether the 
respondent lives in the North, East, or South of the Netherlands (West is ref-
erence group)
• Personality characteristics (including gambling behavior)
• Materialism: Score on Richins’s Material Values Scale (Richins 2004)
• Optimism: Score on the Life Orientation Test—Revised (Scheier et al. 1994)
• Internal locus of control: Score on Short version of the Levenson IPC scale 
(Sapp and Harrod 1993)
• Frequency of lottery participation: Dummy variable indicating that a respond-
ent has at least participated in the State lottery a few times in the last year
• Won in past year: Dummy variable indicating the respondent has had a win in 
the State lottery in the past year
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Table 5  Descriptive statistics
Variables Tables 1–3 (N = 1142) Table 4 (N = 1096)
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
Change in happiness ( T1–T2) − 0.10 − 7 6
Change in happiness ( T1–T3) − 0.22 − 7 6
Lottery ticket 0.89 0 1
Free ticket 0.59 0 1
Purchased ticket 0.04 0 1
Free and purchased ticket 0.26 0 1
Thought about lottery 0.76 0 1
Thought sometimes about lottery 0.61 0 1
Thought frequently about lottery 0.15 0 1
Lottery ticket and no prize 0.44 0 1
Lottery ticket and prize 0.45 0 1
Free ticket and no prize 0.32 0 1
Purchased ticket and no prize 0.01 0 1
Free and purchased ticket and no prize 0.11 0 1
Free ticket and prize 0.27 0 1
Purchased ticket and prize 0.02 0 1
Free and purchased ticket and prize 0.16 0 1
Female 0.47 0 1 0.47 0 1
Age 56.78 18 92 56.61 18 92
Employed 0.46 0 1 0.46 0 1
Unemployed 0.08 0 1 0.08 0 1
High household income 0.46 0 1 0.46 0 1
High education level 0.39 0 1 0.38 0 1
High socio-economic status 0.21 0 1 0.21 0 1
Partner 0.69 0 1 0.68 0 1
Children 0.26 0 1 0.26 0 1
Urban environment 0.40 0 1 0.40 0 1
Northern Netherlands 0.13 0 1 0.13 0 1
Eastern Netherlands 0.19 0 1 0.19 0 1
Southern Netherlands 0.25 0 1 0.25 0 1
Materialism 26.66 9 56 26.68 9 56
Optimism 29.25 9 42 29.27 9 42
Internal locus of control 45.59 25 63 45.61 25 62
Frequent lottery participation 0.64 0 1 0.64 0 1
Won in past year 0.02 0 1 0.02 0 1
Thinks chance of winning is high 0.17 0 1 0.17 0 1
훥 duration questionnaires T1–T2 − 29.29 − 5590.83 1486.93
훥 enjoyability questionnaires T1–T2 0.07 − 4 4
훥 difficulty questionnaires T1–T2 − 0.77 − 4 4
훥 life satisfaction T1–T2 − 0.13 − 9 6
훥 duration questionnaires T1–T3 − 18.76 − 5589.87 2143.21
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• Thinks chance of winning is high: Dummy variable indicating that the 
respondent assessed the chances of ever winning a large price is high (larger 
than a score of 3 on a seven-point scale)
• Perceived survey characteristics
• Change in duration questionnaire: Difference in duration of questionnaire in 
minutes for the different time points.
• Change in enjoyability questionnaire: Difference in enjoyability for the dif-
ferent time points. Based on the question: Did you enjoy filling out this ques-
tionnaire? (1 = Not at all; 5 = Very much).
• Change in difficulty questionnaire: Difference in duration of questionnaire 
for the different time points. Based on the question: Did you find it diffi-
cult answering the questions in this questionnaire? (1 = Not at all; 5 = Very 
much).
• Change in life satisfaction: Change in life satisfaction score between two surveys. 
Based on the question: All things considered, how satisfied are you with your 
life-as-a-whole? (1 = very dissatisfied; 10 = very satisfied) (Table 5).
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